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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we offer a perspective on complementarity, acknowledging that it is not possible
for human perception and cognition to grasp reality with unambiguous concepts or theories.
Therefore, multiple concepts and perspectives are valid when they are not exaggerated beyond
reasonable limits and do not claim exclusive validity. We recommend a humble stance enabling
respectful dialogue between different perspectives in medical science and practice.
KEY POINTS
 No single perspective in clinical or scientific medicine can exhaustively explain medical
phenomena.
 Scientific attitude is characterised by a willingness to look for objections against what we pre-
fer as truths.
 Complementarity or unifying contradictions are concepts that allow for humility and pluralism
in clinical and scientific medicine.
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Introduction
Medical history may appear as a battleground where,
through the centuries, one-eyed Cyclopes have fought
furiously to defend particular versions of oversimplified
medical theories. An example from fairly recent history
is the nineteenth century tension between the conta-
gionists (disease caused by contagions), the miasmatics
(disease caused by poverty), and the constitutionalists
(disease caused by hereditary factors). There is no
doubt that science made progress through such wars,
but in retrospect we understand that the wars were
partly futile because theories were only temporarily
valid, and were succeeded by new and more compre-
hensive theories that reconciled old contradictions. The
scientific revolution and the modern scientific para-
digm were fundamental for medical practice, and
gained dominance in healthcare and in the academy.
At the same time, unease has surfaced as we under-
stand that human suffering and healing cannot be
understood and resolved by biomedical or epidemio-
logical knowledge alone.[1]
During the past four decades, a phenomenological
shift has occurred in medicine and particularly in
general practice. This shift emphasises the clinical and
scientific relevance of personal experience, meaning,
and the functional ability of people in the context of
lived life. This perspective has gained increasing influ-
ence with ethical and theoretical claims from biopsy-
chosocial medicine,[2] patient-centred clinical
methods,[3] and other approaches for the recognition
of patients as people.[4] The change is not only ethic-
ally founded, but is strongly supported by epidemio-
logical and biomolecular research, revealing that
human biology and human experience and biography
are interdependent.[5]
Contemporary science wars
In spite of this shift in medical theory and attempts to
reconcile the tensions between a biomedical and a
biographical perspective, new conflicts arise. Patients
and patient organisations may play a prominent role in
contemporary conflicts. We increasingly observe this as
we are confronted by the third wave of morbidity,
with clusters of subjective ailments in modern soci-
eties. Attempts to make strong claims about the nature
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and management of these health complaints easily
fuel conflicts. In Norway and Denmark inflamed
debates in medical journals and in the press have
revealed that the positions are not easily reconciled.
Patients and patient advocacy organisations emphasise
their rights to acknowledged diagnostic labels and cor-
responding welfare status. For example, members of
the Norwegian Myalgic Encephalopathy Association
oppose research findings that show benefits from
graded training and cognitive therapy, claiming that
their personal experiences invalidate such research
findings.[6]
These conflicts are also fuelled by the introduction
of personalised medicine or P4 medicine, which stands
for predictive, personalised, preventive, and participa-
tory. This initiative claims that it is a unifying effort
answering the challenges of the digital revolution
around managing Big Data. Such data will create deep
insights into disease mechanisms and create metrics
for assessing wellness, according to the proponents of
the theory.[7] The assumption behind P4 theory is that
voluminous data from sensors and personal analytic
devices, and information from a multitude of other
sources, will yield enough data to outweigh the effects
from random variation and will safeguard reasonable
protection against type I errors (erroneous confirm-
ation) and type II errors (erroneous rejection). We
acknowledge this intention as important in science.
However, warnings are raised that beyond a certain
limit the noise from random variation and the risk of
overemphasising irrelevant associations will increase.
Figure 1 illustrates this. The optimal interval is a middle
ground, as the figure illustrates.[8]
A more fundamental critique against P4 medicine
comes from researchers and medical theorists at the
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, who
represent a humanistic and phenomenological
approach in medicine. They claim that subjective
experience is of such fundamental consequence to
human physiology that it represents a merger of
human biography and biology.[5] For medicine to
become person-centred, they advise us rather to
understand the patient as an intentional and moral
human being in a personal context. According to their
view, P4 medicine does not meet the standards of
humanistic medicine.[9]
A complementary approach
We acknowledge this as a relevant critique. However,
we want to emphasise that subjective and objective
medical knowledge are equally important for good
clinical practice. We maintain that medicine is best off
when we accept the tension between objective evi-
dence and subjective experience as a source of learn-
ing and development in clinical and scientific
dialogues.[10] Contradictions in medicine may appear
as antagonisms and exclusive truths. An alternative
perspective is to see contradictions as mutually uniting
or, in other words, as complementary contradictions.
The concept of complementarity was introduced by
the Danish physicist Niels Bohr in order to account for
apparently contradictory phenomena in quantum
mechanics. He showed that such phenomena arise
when one maintains the view of objectivity as ‘‘God’s
Eye View’’ (or a ‘‘view from nowhere’’), and can only be
solved when it is acknowledged that the observer can-
not be eliminated from the description of nature. For
example, experiments have shown that electrons
appear to be both particles and waves. According to
classical physics this is simply impossible, and therefore
it represents an apparent contradiction in quantum
mechanics. However, when the observational condi-
tions are taken into consideration, we may say that
under some conditions electrons behave as if they are
particles, and under other conditions they behave as if
they are waves. According to Bohr, it is imperative to
keep in mind that when we attribute one or another
property to a physical entity, we have to specify
under which conditions those properties can be
observed.[11]
Bohr generalised this idea and applied it to other
fields, for example to biology and psychology.[11] We
may, for example, study an organism as a physical
entity, but then we have to impose observational con-
ditions on the organism that will necessarily suppress
Figure 1. The relation between increasing complexity (amount
of data) and the total number of errors in a scientific model.
The figure illustrates a U-shaped relation resulting from dimin-
ishing bias (increased validity of the scientific model) and an
increasing variation (reduced reliability of the model). A trade-
off with an optimal interval is defined in the figure.[8]
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the aspects that characterise life. Bohr even maintained
that if we try to investigate the ultimate secrets of life
by physical means, we will destroy life. To function as
an organism, the organism will always have enough
freedom to hide its ultimate secrets from us (cited in
[11], p. 97). If we adopt the idea of complementarity,
we acknowledge that objectifying reductionism will
fail. The same applies to an exclusively phenomeno-
logical approach. The two represent complementary
aspects of the same endeavour. Both are relevant for
medical practice and cannot be unified in one perspec-
tive. Bohr’s legacy is thus an appeal to intellectual
humility and pluralism.[12]
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) allowing for
uncertainty
When EBM was introduced it challenged authoritarian
traditions and expert based medicine by introducing
principles for critically appraising the quality of
research evidence in scientific papers.[13,14]
Increasingly, EBM has been accused of establishing
quantitative research evidence at the top of a know-
ledge hierarchy, and of informing clinical work unam-
biguously through guidelines used as instruments for
governance of healthcare staff and institutions. Some
of this critique is obviously relevant and justified.[15]
However, it seems self-contradictory to discard EBM,
and replace it with phenomenology. The first person
perspective also entails the human need for learning
from other people’s experience, i.e., asking for external
evidence. We consider EBM as a tool for improving the
quality of external evidence. When we want to exam-
ine whether a treatment is effective, a randomised clin-
ical trial (RCT), or an estimate of the mean effects from
two or more RCTs (meta-analysis), is the most favour-
able research design. The basic assumption in this kind
of research is that some aspects of our bodies are uni-
versal, and that illness and disease that afflict us may
be placed in a valid category, and thereby diagnosed
in a fairly invariant and consistent manner. Such cate-
gories and treatment effects are less valid when diag-
noses, treatments, and outcomes are complex and
relational. Therefore, interpretation of RCTs and meta-
analyses should be performed with caution.[15] Finally,
RCTs that are conducted in an explanatory design ask
whether an intervention works under ideal or selected
conditions, while RCTs that are conducted in a prag-
matic design ask whether an intervention works under
real-life conditions and whether it works in terms that
matter to the patient. It is for obvious reasons that the
latter design is closest to the truth of how treatment
effects are in a real life setting.
We cannot assume that diagnostic categories and
treatment effects will ever reach absolute certainty.
Rather, EBM gives us a tool to understand that
research and diagnostics are always prone to type I
and type II errors. With EBM we are guided to compare
beneficial effects with unwanted side effects. It enables
us to evaluate diagnostic accuracy and estimate the
risks of under- and over-diagnosis depending upon the
prevalence of diseases. We are also able to assess
the uncertainty in prediction, and thereby understand
that science is prone to bias and conflicts between
external and internal validity.
In the clinical encounter, EBM is applied in order to
examine three different perspectives: (1) the experien-
ces, values, and preferences of the patients; (2) the
context for the encounter and the doctor’s experien-
ces; and (3) the best available external evidence. When
the former two perspectives are suppressed and exter-
nal evidence is applied without reference to the con-
text, personal circumstances, or professional appraisal,
it is no longer evidence based but algorithm driven.
Neither should external evidence be confused with epi-
demiological knowledge. When the questions are why?
and how?, qualitative and phenomenological studies
will constitute the best available evidence.[13] Used
with critical consideration EBM is not a context-
denying perspective that makes subjective experiences
irrelevant.
Scientific pluralism in practice
We aim for a medical professionalism where biomed-
ical and technical knowledge are complemented by
the personal and subjective perspectives, and where
these aspects of professionalism are integrated in both
undergraduate and postgraduate medical training.[16]
Our ambition is that when educating doctors we
should enable them to assess health problems from
more than one perspective of knowledge, and to make
balanced decisions where technical facts and personal
judgement mutually inform each other. In order to
achieve this, we need educational change and a pro-
fessional language that allows us to consider a patient
or a health problem from different perspectives.
We act in contexts that are complex, where simple
and mono-causal explanations are rare, and where
health and disease are unpredictable and open
processes.[17,18]
Research never informs the public unambiguously
and without mediation.[19] Uncertainty and indeter-
minacy are inherent in any research [17] and research
findings must be interpreted and critically
appraised.[20] Therefore, sociologists and philosophers
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of science maintain that research should not only be
methodologically robust but also socially robust.[20]
Socially robust research is characterised by researchers
who are engaged in open dialogue about the conse-
quences of their findings.
In these dialogues researchers should be willing to
scrutinise in what ways their perspectives and precon-
ceptions (upstream factors) decide which truths are
possible to discover and which blind spots their meth-
odological restrictions entail. These reflections should
also examine the intended and unintended conse-
quences of conveying the results and the conclusions
from research papers (downstream factors). Systematic
methods for such critical dialogue have been devel-
oped, e.g., at the Centre for the Study of the Sciences
and the Humanities at the University of Bergen.[21]
The purpose is not to humiliate the researcher or refer
science to an indifferent place in a cacophony of ran-
dom statements. On the contrary, using self-criticism
the researchers should promote their integrity not only
as experts of opinion, but also as dialogue partners in
society.[22] A true scientific attitude is characterised by
a willingness to look for objections against what we
prefer as truths, and to invite others to promote such
objections.
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